“Establish a Performance‑Aligned Unlock Schedule for the Remaining 80% of Investor WLFI Allocations”
### Summary
Example of unlock time frame
As of 1st June 2026
This proposal defines a new unlock schedule for the remaining 80% of WLFI tokens allocated to investors, spreading their release over 2–3 years with conditions designed to protect the WLFI ecosystem, support USD1 growth, and align long‑term incentives. It offers two alternative schedules (Option A and Option B); token holders will select one, or reject both.
### Scope
- Applies only to **investor allocations** (early supporters, strategic investors, funds) that remain locked under the current vesting contracts (“Investor Lockboxes”).
- Does **not** modify:
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Team & advisor allocations.
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Community growth & incentive pools.
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Treasury holdings used for USD1 incentives.
- Requires migration or upgrade of investor Lockbox contracts to an approved on‑chain vesting controller governed by WLFI holders.
## 5. Option A – 3‑Year Linear Vesting with Soft Performance Gates
**Design intent:** Very predictable, low‑shock, long vest; adds *soft* performance conditions as “accelerators” but does not fully block unlocks if metrics underperform.
### Parameters
- **Base vesting term:** 36 months from T0 (proposal execution date).
- **Cliff:** 6‑month cliff on the *remaining* 80%; no additional tokens unlocked to investors during this period beyond existing commitments.
- **Base vesting curve:**
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Months 0–6: 0% of remaining 80% unlocked.
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Months 7–36: Equal monthly unlocks of the 80% (80% / 30 ≈ 2.67% of *investor remaining* per month).
- **Soft performance gates (accelerators):**
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If **USD1 circulating supply** maintains ≥ $5b for a rolling 90‑day period, the vesting speed can increase by +10% (e.g., 2.67% → 2.94% per month for that period).[11][4]
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If **USD1 onchain transaction volume** (on Ethereum + BSC + primary partner chains) averages ≥ $2b/month over a rolling 3‑month period, another +10% acceleration can be applied.
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Acceleration caps at +25% over the base rate to avoid runaway unlocks.
- **Buyback & burn integration:**
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The unlock controller reads a **POL‑burn index** (total WLFI burned via POL since T0).
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For each 1% of total supply burned via POL, monthly investor unlocks are reduced by 0.25% of the remaining schedule for the following 3 months (soft offset).
### Executable on-chain implementation
- Deploy a **VestingController** contract that:
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Holds or controls all investor Lockbox contracts with remaining 80% allocations.
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Stores per‑investor balances and vesting parameters (start time, cliff, remaining amount).
- Vesting logic:
- `claimable = f(time, base_rate, accel_factor, burn_adjustment)`; investors call `claim()` to receive newly vested WLFI into their wallets.
- Data inputs:
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USD1 supply and volume read from an oracle or from a canonical “USD1Metrics” contract maintained by WLFI governance.
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POL burn index updated by the buyback & burn executor contract.
- Governance hooks:
- WLFI DAO can pause or modify accelerators via future proposals, but cannot increase the total remaining amount beyond the original 80% per address.
## 6. Option B – 2‑Year Stepped Vesting with Hard Performance & Behavior Conditions
**Design intent:** Faster unlock for aligned investors, stronger protection for the ecosystem; hard gates tied to USD1 adoption and investor behavior (no aggressive dumping).
### Parameters
- **Base vesting term:** 24 months from T0.
- **Cliff:** 3 months on the remaining 80%.
- **Stepped curve:**
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Month 0–3: 0% of remaining 80% unlocks.
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Month 4: 10% of remaining 80% unlocks.
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Months 5–12: monthly unlocks totaling an additional 30% of remaining 80% (≈3.75% of remaining / month).
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Months 13–24: monthly unlocks totaling the final 40% of remaining 80% (≈3.33% of remaining / month).
- **Hard performance gates:**
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Gate 1 (USD1 adoption):
- If USD1 circulating supply is below $2b for 60 consecutive days, all **new** monthly investor unlocks are reduced by 50% until the metric recovers for a 30‑day period.[11][5]
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Gate 2 (price stability):
- If WLFI 30‑day TWAP price falls >50% from the TWAP at T0, unlocks are paused for one full month; if condition persists, a new governance vote is required to resume.
- **Investor behavior condition (anti‑dump):**
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Each investor address (or whitelisted beneficiary set) has a **rolling 90‑day sell‑limit** of 25% of its total unlocked investor allocation on centralized and decentralized venues (tracked via transparent whitelisting and an off/on‑chain attestation component with CEX partners).
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If an investor exceeds that limit (e.g., provable via on‑chain analysis and CEX attestation), their future vesting schedule is slowed by 50% for 6 months.
### Executable on-chain implementation
- Use the same **VestingController** skeleton, but with:
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Step‑function vesting logic (based on months since T0).
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Boolean flags for “Gate 1 active / inactive” and “Gate 2 price‑pause active / inactive”.
- Behavior tracking:
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On‑chain: any transfers from investor addresses to known DEX pools are counted directly.
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Off‑chain: WLFI Foundation / DAO establishes **CEX reporting agreements** where large unlock beneficiaries are tagged, and CEX share aggregated sell‑volume proofs (e.g., Merkle proofs or signed summaries).
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VestingController can apply slowdown penalties via a `setPenalty(address, factor, duration)` function callable only by governance or an audited compliance oracle.
***
## 7. Governance process and ballot design
### Proposal actions
The on‑chain proposal should:
1. **Authorize migration** of all remaining investor Lockbox balances (the 80%) into the new VestingController contract.
2. **Deploy VestingController** with both vesting schemas pre‑coded, but only **one path activated** based on governance choice.
3. **Link oracles and metrics:**
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Set the USD1 metrics source address.
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Set the WLFI price oracle for TWAP.
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Set the POL burn index source (buyback executor).
4. **Choose Option A or B:**
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If Option A wins, activate linear‑with‑soft‑gates logic.
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If Option B wins, activate stepped‑with‑hard‑gates logic.
### Voting options
To make this clean and executable on‑chain:
- **FOR A:** Adopt Option A (3‑year linear with soft performance gates and burn‑offset adjustments).
- **FOR B:** Adopt Option B (2‑year stepped vesting with hard performance & behavior conditions).
- **AGAINST:** Reject both; maintain current 80% investor lockbox terms.
- **ABSTAIN:** No preference.
The governance contract should be written so that only one of the two configurations is activated depending on which receives the highest vote share above quorum and threshold; otherwise, state remains unchanged.
***
## 8. Ecosystem health considerations
- Both alternatives explicitly **tie investor liquidity to USD1 and WLFI health metrics**, aligning with your existing policies of using WLFI treasury to grow USD1 and directing POL fees to buyback & burn.[6][5]
- Option A favors **predictability and gradualism**, likely preferred by large institutions and investors that want transparency and lower governance overhead.
- Option B favors **stronger downside protection**, tying unlock speed to ecosystem performance and discouraging aggressive dumping at the cost of more complexity and enforcement friction.
Call to Action
- Option A
- Option B
- Abstain for more clarity from WLFI crew and better market conditions, app development etc